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Approved For Release 2004/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200150077-3

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Public opinion estimates (in NIE's) 7 January 1954

FDD and [redacted]

(continuation of NIE factors in general)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Overall Requirements for Propaganda Analysis by [redacted] and FDD

and FDD

1. In response to your request this office has prepared the attached study of Soviet Bloc intelligence requirements. It would be highly useful to have thorough propaganda analysis on these subjects in support of national intelligence estimates. The list is, of course, illustrative rather than exhaustive and covers only the key areas of the Bloc. Moreover, it was prepared from the point of view of a consumer, and we recognize that some of the subjects might not, at least in their present form, be suitable for propaganda analysis. We are aware that it requires a trained propaganda analyst to ascertain which topics can be most fruitfully studied. Finally, we believe that propaganda analysis operations need not be limited to meeting such external requirements but should be a continuing element in the intelligence process, independently analyzing Bloc mass communications, and constantly providing to consumers like O/NS a self-initiated flow of analyses.

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2. The wide use by the entire intelligence community of the existing [redacted] monitoring of Soviet propaganda is ample indication of the unquestioned value of this source in giving us insights into developments behind the Curtain. We believe, however, that the value of this great mass of descriptive raw material is greatly enhanced when analyzed by experts and put into more finished form. The propaganda analyses which have been done by [redacted] small analysis unit have been extremely useful in the preparation of NIE's. Cases in point are studies done for us on Albania, Yugoslavia, East Germany, etc. The very value of these studies convinces us that this source should be more fully tapped. In our opinion propaganda analysis can turn a Soviet weapon — their propaganda — into a potent intelligence tool, one all the more urgently needed because the Soviet security system makes our intelligence data on this critical area so hard to come by and so sparse.

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


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
SHOBAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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